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Advice for Religious Historians: On the Myth of

a Purely Historical Jesus
ALAN G. PADGETT

both inThe nn^,601
^as turned to the ‘historical Jesus’,
from the presses A
many academic voIumes speeding
and the so-niu i t
K 9Uest for the historical Jesus has begun,
Gosnels fh " w i.^SUS ^cminar has produced a new version of the
Galileo '(-m
° dFS ^ers’on’ of The Five Gospels, dedicated to
shin nroviri °ng °
^uch general interest in historical scholar
ly- entfl eS US
an °PP°rtunhy to reflect on the legitimacy of
emir -in rPriS<? and hideed, to reflect on the character of our acad<rmiC'\^rOaC
re'igious studies. In this essay I will pursue two
once- 'hst, I wish to debunk a powerful and influential
enpp 5 an-S1u^ rOm ^1C hobghtenment divorce of religion and sci’ W,
assunies that a purely neutral, value-free ‘scientific’
pproac o the historical Jesus is desirable and possible.2 Second, I
ope o provide an alternative, post-modern approach which inte
grates iaith and science, as indeed the real Galileo did.3
V’ V?°Ver an(i l'le Iesus Seminar, The Five Gospels: The Search for
onJs°f Jesus (New York: Macmillan, 1993). By the ‘Jesus Seminar’ I
tiltinn -,LS To”'
forporate authors of this book and its introduction. I am not
onnt it. °iU <; scl‘)ars as individuals, many of whom I know and respect. For a
h • 1 t ° ucl on t0 tlc work of the Jesus Seminar and the ‘Third Quest’ for this hisTrinUy ei993jee ^drCUS B°rS> Jesi|s in Contemporary Scholarship (Valley Forge, Pa.:
thf

will -ilw„ ‘

. 1 r* ^'s es,say 1 “se ‘science’ in a very broad sense, as it is used in Latin (scienw), Greek (episteme), and German (Wissenschaft), to refer to any academic, rigorous
enquiry that is based upon evidence, reason, and argument. I do not reduce ‘science’
to mean the natural sciences, as many Americans do.
. 3 A*ne ‘s a m*kl sort of post-modernism. By ‘post-modern’ I only mean a view that
is critical of the Enlightenment. Relativism is not implied in this term as I use it. After
completing this essay, I discovered that my basic thesis is advocated by Robert
Morgan in his contribution to the G. B. Caird memorial volume, ‘The Historical Jesus
and the Theology of the New Testament’, in L. D. Hurst and N. T. Wright (eds.), The
Glory of Christ in the New Testament (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), 187-206. However,
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Like earlier theologians reflecting on the problem of faith and his
tory, such as Alan Richardson, Richard R. Niebuhr, and Wolfhart
Pannenberg, I have found that reflection upon the early Christian
claim that Jesus rose from the dead is a powerful place from which
to consider the relationship between faith and historical research.4
I will propose no new interpretation of the data, but rather reflect
on the very practice of historiography in the face of the historical
claim that Jesus rose from the dead. I hope to show, furthermore,
that reflection on the difference between historical and theological
explanation clarifies the sense in which the resurrection is a ‘his
torical’ event.
At one time in our Western universities we were certain of how
history should proceed, as a rigorous, value-free, scientific disci
pline. But that era is now over. How shall we now proceed? Does
‘anything go’ in historical research now that modernity is over?
How shall we understand the discipline of religious history in a post
positivist, post-modern situation? For modernity, with its faith in
reason and its myth of neutral, scientific scholarship, is well and
truly dead. Requiescat in pace.
We stand at the end of the twentieth century asking much the
same question as religious thinkers at the end of the nineteenth cen
tury in Europe: what is the right method by which to approach the
history of religion? The answer given in particular by that brilliant
German scholar Ernst Troeltsch is this: the proper method for the
study of religion is a purely scientific historiography that is value-

Morgan’s elegant argument pertains only to NT theology. I believe it applies (mutatis
mutandis) to any historical approach to Jesus from any faith perspective. Morgan in
turn points us to Adolf Schlatter, who anticipated many of the points I make here.
See Robert Morgan (ed.), The Nature of New Testament Theology, SBT, 2nd ser., 25
(London: SCM, 1973), which contains Schlatter’s 1909 essay, ‘The Theology of the
New Testament and Dogmatics’.
4 I am referring to Alan Richardson, Christian Apologetics (London: SCM, 1947);
Richard R. Niebuhr, Resurrection and Historical Reason (New York: Scribner’s, 1957);
and W. Pannenberg, ‘Redemptive Event and History’, first published in German (KD,
I959)> trans. S. Guthrie, in Basic Questions in Theology, i (Philadelphia: Fortress,
1970), 15-80, also partly found in C. Westermann (ed.), Essays on Old Testament
Hermeneutics (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1963), 314-35. Each of these works was
published independently of the others in the 1940s or 1950s, each in its own way
responding to Barth and Bultmann on this topic. See also Pannenberg’s later work,
Jesus—God and Man, trans. L. L. Wilkins and D. A. Priebe (Philadelphia: Westminster,
1968).

,
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method
to {y neutral
uiral- s t1 uhave traced this answer and this
ree and back
religi0Us
‘purely historic'il,1S S°Urces in Western intellectual history. This
to Jesus Tbp
aPProach to religion was first applied specifically
Strauss anti w-wUInent
scdfd;irs like H. S. Reimarus, David
approach to Jesus v™ Wrede WaS that the °nly proper’ scholarly
rejected all retain.,^ c}purely histOTi«>l, purely scientific one that
the Enlightenment
aS distortin8 and unscientific.6 Because
Christianitv
t Was a Western movement, and because
EnS t‘“y
«•
religion of the West, the
scholarlv ‘ eti- Tas f°rced to answer the question of what a proper,
is follntv/] r,n l^ ltened approach to Jesus was. Their answer, which
Semlnar’ ’ "m 8“”8 to '“M •“‘e
“

a
p°in^ to use the specific issue of the resurrection of Jesus as
rAlim-n, or e^dminln8 the myth of a purely historical approach to
park ru S r 'CS r^'e resurrechon is a fascinating claim made by
J, • - kI1S lari|S5 .^°r il: 'S at once
a claim about history and a
a. 0Ut: re *P'OUS truth. How then shall we academics, we ‘scien r ic investigators of religion, approach such a claim?
ne easy and common answer is quite simple: dismiss the claim
a once as impossible, and perhaps begin a historical and sociologica investigation of why early Christians would create such a
my 10 ogical tale. After all, we all know (don’t we?) that dead
peop e stay dead, and that resurrections are in fact scientifically
impossible, this is the approach of Rudolf Bultmann and his fol
lowers, along with the vast majority of academics in religious stud
ies today. Ibis easy and common response to the claim that Jesus
actually rose from the dead points to something important: the role

, 5 See his essay, ‘Historiography’, in J. Hastings (ed.), Encyclopedia of Religion find
Ethics (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1913), vi. 7x6-23. Troeltsch’s philosophy of his
tory is in fact very nuanced. He rejected the certainty of historical judgement, argu
ing that world-views and historical science are sometimes in tension. Nevertheless,
for Troeltsch as I read him, scientific historiography is an absolute value, arising
within a particular context, that all academics should adopt qua academics. See fur
ther his Religion in History, trans. J. L. Adams and W. E. Dense (Minneapolis: Fortress,
1991). So even when he is striving ‘to recognize an influence of faith on science’,
Troeltsch cannot help but write, ‘the empirical sciences in themselves are wholly
independent of faith and follow their own laws’ (p. 130).
6 See H. S. Reimarus, Fragments (c.1775), ed. C. H. Talbert (London: SCM, 1971)1
David F. Strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, trans. George Eliot (1846;
London: SCM, 1973). For Wrede, see Morgan, Nature of New Testament Theology.

L
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of presuppositions and bias in historiography.7 This influence of
world-views upon academic and scientific investigation has many
names, and is widely believed today. Any quest for knowledge, and
considerations of argument and evidence, will be biased by the
investigator’s world-view. For want of a better name, I will call this
‘the prejudice of perspective’. Bultmann himself would agree with
us, of course. In a famous paper he asked: ‘Is Exegesis without
Presuppositions Possible?’8 The right answer, of course, is ‘No’, and
this was indeed Bultmann’s answer, much to his credit. My prob
lem with Bultmann is that he imports presuppositions that are anti
thetical to Christian faith, especially those that lie behind the myth
of a purely historical Jesus.9

I The Myth Exposed
Behind the myth is a basic assumption we need to examine: that
religious faith corrupts scientific research. This powerful and attrac
tive ideology in Western culture is still responsible for much of the
rhetoric in biblical and religious studies about ‘scholarly’
approaches to our topic. For example, the Jesus Seminar shows its
arrogance and prejudice in this false claim: ‘The Christ of creed and
dogma, who had been firmly in place in the Middle Ages, can no
longer command the assent of those who have seen the heavens
through Galileo’s telescope.’10 In my analysis of this myth, I have
discovered three underlying assumptions:
(1) That religious faith distorts scientific, critical scholarship.
(2) Because this is true, the only proper, academic, scientific methodology
in religious studies is one that rejects religious faith itself.
7 Numerous scholars have noticed this before, including Schlatter and
Richardson (cited above). More recently, among others, G. N. Stanton, ‘Pre
suppositions in New Testament Criticism’, in I. H. Marshall (ed.), New Testament
Interpretation (Exeter/Grand Rapids, Mich.: Paternoster Press/Eerdmans, 1977),
60-71. See also the next note on Bultmann. On world-views and belief in miracles
see R. G. Swinburne, The Concept of Miracles (London: Macmillan, 1970), who argues
that background beliefs influence our judgements of historical probability.
8 The English translation of this paper is found in R. Bultmann, Existence and
Paith, ed. S. Ogden (Cleveland: Meridian Books, i960), 289-98.
9 For a careful critique of Bultmann see R. C. Roberts, Rudolf Bultmann’s Theology
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1976).
10 Funk et al. (eds.), Five Gospels, 2.
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(3) That a
S?y fj^toricak scientific, faith-free and value-neutral methodology
available to us in what we might broadly call the socialscientific disciplines.

I will argue that each of these ideas is false, and, even more, that
this ideology as a whole is deluding and distorts the quest for trut
about religion. Finally, the myth of a purely historical and faith-free
approach to religion is part of an ideology which is destructive o
human flourishing, because it seeks to separate faith and values on
the one hand and science and reason on the other.
Troeltsch, Wrede, and their many followers were working agains
another, earlier approach to religious history, called the dogmatic
method or ‘apologetics’ in the negative sense of these terms. In t is
method, one assumes the truth of a religion, and then fin s t is
truth in the historical sources (surprisel). This kind of vicious cir
cular reasoning can in fact prove anything to be true. So I com
pletely agree with modernity and its rejection of the ear ier,
dogmatic approach to religious history. Furthermore, I do e ieve
that we must continue to study religions in an academic, sc 10 ar y
way that accepts criticism and argument as necessary correctives o
our biases and prejudices. I do not want to be heard as sugges 1
that we throw out rigorous, scientific research. The canons 0
torical criticism are a lasting contribution to our civi iza 1°n’
concern is not with our methods, but rather with our a 1
toward them and toward religious faith. I want to examm
,
myth of a purely historical Jesus, and'consider its s or comi
will suggest that we must replace this attractive and P°we* “
,
logy (the ‘myth’) with one that is more humble, o 1 >
accepting of religious belief.
, k at
Such a claim obviously needs substantiation, so we
the basic assumptions of the myth. First of all, suppose y,
faith distorts the quest for a purely historical esu,Jhe Jes^
Seminar participants, and many others mten
example5 Ed
research from the ‘oppression of dogmatism. _
Sanders in his book Jesus and Judaism writes t c
f
engaged for some years in the effortan
the control of theology’ and I aim on y [ ] o
imDiv substitute
exegete’.11 Both aims are, alas, ImpossibleJ’
one ‘theology’ (or ‘mythology’ as Burton Mack calls it)
11 E. P. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), 333 f.
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The myth of a purely historical Jesus helps the exegete fool herself
about this substitution (that is particularly obvious in the work of
the Jesus Seminar12).
Because of the prejudice of perspective there is no such thing as
a purely historical, value-free, neutral scientific approach to the his
torical Jesus. Indeed, I would argue that there is no purely histori
cal, value-free, neutral scientific approach to any great religious
figure or controversial person from the past. The truth of this point
is made clear by a controversial (but hardly religious) figure known
to all of us: Richard Nixon. If you watch the Oliver Stone film Nixon
and follow it with a visit to the Nixon Library, you find yourself ask
ing, ‘Will the real Richard Nixon please stand up?’ And it is very
obvious that the political biases of both the Nixon Library and Oliver
Stone have influenced their quite distinct interpretations of the real
Nixon of history. If the prejudice of perspective is true for our inter
pretation of Nixon—a very famous leader in our own country and
our own time, about whom many, many facts are known—imag
ine how much more it must influence our treatment of Jesus or, for
that matter, Buddha or Confucius.
The myth of a purely historical Jesus, of course, has had tremen
dous cultural appeal, especially among academics, for some time
now. For almost 200 years academics have sought this El Dorado,
this powerful but ultimately elusive and deluding mythology, and
like De Soto have often lost their way. I am not suggesting that no
important advances have been made in the quest for the historical
Jesus; they have. Rather, my point is that this mythology of a
purely neutral, faith-free approach has deluded scholars concerning
the importance, character, and meaning of their results.
I will examine two versions of this myth, and criticize each one.
The first version I call ‘the neutrality two-step’ in which the preju
dice of perspective is recognized, but then we try and step around it
back into scientific neutrality. For the ‘neutrality two-step’ version
of the myth, the problem of perspective is a problem only for faith—
not for the scientific, rational scholar who of course has no faith 1 A
second version of the myth is one I call ‘the consensus Jesus’, in
12 I’or a good critique of the work of the Seminar, see Luke T. Johnson, The Real
Jesus (San Francisco: Harper, 1995). I agree with much of what Johnson has to say,
but in the end his own view still divides faith and science. Our spiritual knowledge
of the real, risen Jesus must be subject to critical, scientific reflection and historical
examination (I do not say historical ‘verification’—I agree with Johnson that such
verification is impossible for historical science).
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which a consensus theory of truth is supposed to lead us to the real
Jesus of history.
I will start with the most important version of the myth, the neu
trality two-step. Many scholars today are sophisticated enough to
realize that hermeneutic theory, epistemology, and the philosophy
of science all converge at one point: namely, what I have called e
prejudice of perspective. A purely neutral science is both un esir
able and not possible in the first place.13 Having recognize t e pre
judice of perspective, however, scholars still seem to hope t at our
biases and prejudices can be overcome through carefu re lgio
neutrality and scientific method. Let us pay attention to e ‘
and hope that all this interpretation stuff goes away, they see
be saying. As long as we focus on the right methodology, ar
orously sceptical of the sources, and are as neutral an sci®n^}ce
possible, excluding religious presuppositions, then t e preju 1
_
perspective will not affect our results. This, of course, is simp
delusion of the part of scholars.
v of either
An example of the neutrality two-step would be the wor,
Ed Sanders or Burton Mack.14 For both men, ‘theology
word, and theological commitments tend to distort an
‘
tral, scientific research. That their own wor -views
us
warp their own work is, of course, equally obvious,^^^^ Mack
For all of us approach our work with some sort0 c
interpreand Sanders have their own agendas, which dis or
tations of Jesus, as does the Jesus Seminar.
orni1i4 be Gary
Another example ot the neutrality two-steE, worfd be
V
Habermas, a conservative apologist. He writes.
to take towards history is one of caution as we shouid
recognize this subjective bias and then mak

and

I have with Peter
” The separation of faith from science is the major pr° gejiej (Oxford: Oxford
Carnley’s otherwise excellent hook The Structure of
scientific facts about Jesus a
University Press, 1987). Carnley wants to> add to pure
352_8). The fuslon
mythopoetic appropriation of the Spirit.ofTh11
(faith the
0/ careful
of faith and science I have in mind presume

Christian Origins (Philadelphia: Portress,
of Q and Christian Origins (San tranciscm Hii p
is not so much 1

I993). Por Mack
(these words denote, fo
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for it.’15 This sentence is an almost perfect example of what I mean
by the neutrality two-step, in fact. Of course, Habermas and other
apologists have their agenda, too, and want history to be neutral so
that they can use it to prove that Christianity is true. Allow me one
final example: Willi Marxsen, a follower of Bultmann and a wellknown New Testament scholar, defines ‘the historical Jesus’ as
‘Jesus before anyone has ventured an interpretation of him’.16 This
might be the true Jesus, but it is hardly the historical Jesus. Of
course no such Jesus can be known, for the knowing process is itself
an interpretation.
The neutrality two-step is close to being right. I agree that reli
gious and historical claims must be subject to critical, scientific
examination. The fundamental flaw in the neutrality two-step is
this: all data is already infected by theory. World-views don’t just
give us the questions we ask; they also affect our understanding of
the evidence and our historical judgement. There just is no such
thing as data apart from some interpretation. The question of what
counts as ‘evidence’ or ‘data’ is already biased by our prior inter
ests, theories, and world-views. So the neutrality two-step just trips
us up as we reflect upon the relationship between faith and science.
The neutrality two-step is also self-deluding. It leads to a bias
against theological commitments in historical science, without rec
ognizing the distorting elements in the researcher’s own world
view. The rhetoric of the Jesus Seminar is a good example of what
I mean by the self-deluding character of myth.
The best-known and most sophisticated version of the neutrality
two-step is found in a book dedicated to Professor Bultmann, Van
Harvey’s The Historian and the Believer.17 Harvey develops a ‘moral
ity of knowledge’ in which the religious faith of the believing histo
rian so distorts and warps her judgement that the validity of her
reasoning process is called into question. Harvey’s book downplays
two important factors: first, the secular unbeliever is just as dis
torted and warped by his prejudice and world-view as the believer
is; second, who is to say that Christian faith does not give us better
15 Gary Habermas, Ancient Evidence for the Life of Jesus (Nashville: Nelson, 1984),
18.
16 W. Marxsen, Jesus and Easter, trans. V. P. Furnish (Nashville: Abingdon,
I99°)> 16. Of course Marxsen is not a slavish follower of Bultmann, and disagrees
with him on several points (these are helpfully outlined in G. O’Collins, Jesus Risen
(Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 1987), 65 f.).
17 Van A. Harvey, The Historian and the Believer (New York: Macmillan, 1966).
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insight into the data than unbelief does? Why should unbelief,
rather than faith, lead to the best explanation of the evidence^
Would it be so strange if the followers of Jesus have an inside track
in the understanding of Jesus? Why is faith so damaging to reason,
anyway?
Granted that faith is a kind of prejudice, perhaps it is a helpfu
prejudice. Helpful prejudices can give us insight into data, an c ear
the way for understanding. For example, the planet Neptune was
discovered because of prejudice on the part of astronomers in av<?ur
of classical mechanics. And the Marxist prejudice of liberation e
ologians has helped us to see what the Bible really does say a o
poverty and liberation. As Gadamer has argued, we all s an
some tradition, and have some prejudice, when we aPP™aa
task of interpretation.18 Not all tradition and prejudice is a .
can be helpful. All reasoning is based upon some preju ice,
insight and research takes place from a particular position, a
the light of a particular world-view and tradition of enquiry,
is ‘no view from nowhere’ to borrow a phrase rom
Nagel.
i
r i
The question of whether a certain prejudice is helpful or ai\
in the evaluation of evidence cannot be decided a Prion a
, .
wants it to be.20 It is only in the give and take o ia o
the evaluation of reasons, arguments, and evi en
not
pre-understanding will be found to be helpful or arna•
suggesting that we abandon rational enquiry or scien i
raphy. Nor do I suggest that biblical schoars
that the
Christian dogmatism of a previous age. Rather, 1 gg
myth of a neutral, scientific history, which ^vJh(orlack
throughout his book, distorts the relationship e w
of it!) and historical research. The casua dismsstdof the ch

Jesus may indeed have risen from the ea
.
dice, for it is founded upon a fallacious conception

f natural

» Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and MM 2nd English edn. (New York

Continuum, I99H original Gemian edn. 19 )•
Oxford University Press, 1985k
1* Thomas Nagel, The View from Noivhcr (
o
All of Harvey’s discussion
20 See e.g. Harvey, The Historian and the Beh^'b~cluse he misunderstands the

known’ (p- 242)-
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science and the ‘laws’ of nature (which are purely descriptive, not
prescriptive). It is no accident that Van Harvey’s book is dedicated
to Professor Bultmann, and perpetuates the misunderstanding of
faith and science one finds in Bultmann and his school.
The implications of the myth of a purely historical Jesus are in
fact a road-block to historical knowledge of the real Jesus. For it is
part of the myth that religious faith distorts our knowledge of real
ity. Since the New Testament is written, in part, from a faith per
spective, it must be questioned at every turn. For example, in his
book A Future for the Historical Jesus, Leander Keck writes (correctly
in my view) that ‘every believer and every theologian has central
things at stake in the historical study of Jesus’.21 I applaud Keck’s
rejection of the attempt to divorce faith and science, characteristic
of the Bullmann school. But when Keck insists that ‘a skeptical atti
tude toward the sources’ is necessary, he has obviously bought into
the myth of a purely historical Jesus.22 Why is a sceptical attitude
necessary? Only because, as a hidden premiss, we must doubt any
historical claim that could come from a faith perspective. But all his
torical writing comes from a faith perspective. We must, indeed,
accept a critical attitude toward all historical sources and artefacts.
But a critical attitude which looks for reasons and evidence is not
the same thing as a sceptical attitude, based upon a prejudice against
religious faith in the sources. Such a scepticism, the ‘guilty until
proved innocent’ modern attitude toward the New Testament, actu
ally blocks good historical research. Once again we can cite the
Jesus Seminar:23 ‘methodological skepticism’ was a working prin
ciple of the Seminar; ‘when in sufficient doubt, leave it out’. In fact
the Seminar seems to work on the principle, ‘when there is any
doubt, leave it out’. There is much we can learn historically from
the New Testament, but not if we insist on doubting every line of it
until we can prove it to be true. In logic, we would call this the fal
lacy of ‘poisoning the well’. In the history of philosophy, it repre
sents Descartes’ approach to epistemology, and that is a blind alley.
So, ironically, the myth of a purely historical Jesus ends up distort
ing what the very quest for the true Jesus was created to assist.
Such is the human condition!
Another version of the myth of a purely historical Jesus is
the ‘consensus Jesus’. Once again, some scholars recognize the
21 L. Keck, A Future for the Historical Jesus (Nashville: Abingdon, 1971), 38.
22 Ibid. 21.
25 Funk et al. (eds.), Five Gospels, 37.
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prejudice of perspective, but then try to dance around it. InAhis v
sion, they hope that a consensus of New Testamen s
provide us with the ‘true’ Jesus of history. A brilliant ^mpl
method, which I admire very much, is A Margma J j
Meier.24 While Meier’s historical judgement is exce
’tation of
scholarship and knowledge are profound, is pre
method is quite flawed. To see why this is so, le ,
Jesus’,
distinctions in our terminology. By ‘thetrue
’ gth as he really
or ‘the Jesus of history’ I will mean Jesus of N y
was in the past. However, by ‘the historical Iesu&
as we can
mon usage and understand these terms to
<pnnsensus Jesus’
know him through historical research. final y, Y
, a consenI will understand the Jesus who is known to us
sus of current New Testament scholarship.
There is very little hope that the consensus Jesus will yield to us
the real Jesus. This is so for both theoretical and practical reasons.
As any first-year philosophy student knows, the consensus theory
of truth is bogus. Just because a group of humans think something
is true does not make it true. At the practical end, we always have
to ask the critical or Marxist question: who defines the consensus?
The so-called consensus of the Jesus Seminar is obviously base
upon personalities and a priori ideology, as anyone who is aware 0
the history and personalities behind the group knows. Or again, m
his very interesting book The Quest for a Post-Uistorica Jesus,
William Hamilton tells us that there is a consensus among cu^re^5
scholars that no historical knowledge of the real Jesus is possi e.
As a factual statement about the academy of biblical scholarship,
this ‘consensus’ is obviously false. I am afraid that the consensus
Jesus will yield us nothing, and cannot lead to any sound, scien 11
results about history, or indeed about any scientific topic.
Now consensus is important, of course, in many areas o 1 e.
are wise to rely upon a consensus of experts, when t ere is s
,
for topics in which we are not well versed ourse yes. u 1
own areas of expertise, scientific investigators must ignore e
sensus’ in favour of the evidence and arguments themselvesc M
best, a consensus might provide a beginning for our own care
examination of the issues. Unlike the Jesus Seminar, which is pop
24 John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew (2 vols.; Garden City, NiY:
e^9yOrk:
25 W. Hamilton, A Quest for the Post-JUstortcal Jesus (London/we
SCM/Continuum,.i994)> 19-
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scholarship, Meier is better than the methodology he espouses. Like
so many other scholars, he is aware of the prejudice of perspective,
but does not realize the implications of this prejudice for his own
work. He writes, ‘we abstract from Christian faith because we are
involved in the hypothetical reconstruction of a past figure by purely
scientific means’.26 In another place he indicates that, ‘to be sure, A
Marginal Jew works with presuppositions, but they are the general
presuppositions of historiography’.27
The point that must be made against the ‘consensus Jesus’ ver
sion of the myth of a purely historical Jesus is that our presupposi
tions are pluralistic, and that they inevitably influence our
gathering of the data, our grasp of what counts as ‘evidence’, and
our interpretation of that evidence. None of the natural or histori
cal sciences has as criteria or indices of truth a consensus among
investigators, and for very good reasons. We may try to be as rea
sonable and rational as possible, but we cannot escape from our
own prejudices. And since our perspectives are so pluralistic, the
consensus Jesus becomes a minimalist Jesus. If we were really to
base a book on Jesus just upon what all, or 90 per cent, of 75 per
cent (how shall we define ‘consensus’?) of what all New Testament
scholars agree upon, the resulting book would be a lot shorter than
A Marginal Jewl And honestly, of what scientific value would such
a purely sociological study be? At best it might give us a startingpoint for our own investigations, based upon our own faith and our
own methods, but we would still have to reinvestigate each point
for ourselves. And this consensus Jesus would be a jaundiced, ema
ciated Jesus, for there are so few facts we can all agree on. The con
sensus Jesus is not even the historical Jesus, much less the real Jesus
of history.
I hope I have said enough to indicate that the myth of the purely
historical Jesus is a false ideology imposed upon religious studies by
the Enlightenment. It is self-deluding, and it also distorts the
attempt to come to know the real Jesus. The myth ‘poisons the well’
with respect to the only significant sources we have to study the his
torical Jesus. Now it is certainly true that a dogmatic method, which
presumes the results of critical enquiry before the give and take of
evidence, argument, and reasoning takes place, is destructive of
true critical scholarship. But religious faith does not have to lead to
26 Meier, Marginal Jew, i. 30 f.; my italics.

27 Ibid. ii.
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dogmatism of this kind, and it often does not. I have met many dog
matic atheists, who arrogantly assume that scientific materialism is
the only rational world-view, and that Christian theology is just
another kind of ancient myth. Belief that all truth is God’s truth,
that God is the maker of heaven, earth, and my neighbour, can and
does lead to open enquiry, toleration, understanding, and careful
scholarship. Adolf Schlatter would be a good example of this in New
Testament studies. Moreover, have we forgotten that the founders
of natural science were men of faith? Bor Copernicus, Kep er,
Galileo, and Newton belief in a rational Creator was a fundamenta
assumption for the scientific quest. So the first assumption o t e
myth, that religious faith corrupts scientific research, is bot a se
as an idea, and self-deluding as an ideology. It allows researc ers o
believe about themselves—falsely, of course that their own. ai
stance and their own world-view do not corrupt their researc .
The assumption, left over from Enlightenment prejudice, t at re i
gious faith corrupts science is self-deluding, and it distorts t e ques
for religious truth; but finally, it is part of the divorce between sci
ence and faith. The idea that the only proper approach to re igio
is one that ignores or brackets religious faith is part o an ove™
attempt to ‘free’ science from the ‘biases’ of religion an mora 1 ,
an idea we can trace to the French encyclopedists. An t is ivo
has been destructive in our own century, to our own peop e.
<
to bad religion, and to bad science and technology.
0
,
religion divorced from reason, or scientific experiment s an
cation that ignore moral truth? We know now that science a
technology are not autonomous realms, free from su
‘
T
respect for life and love for people of other ^^^^^'is
would like to point out that the myth of a purely hlS^^S^
part of the overall attempt to separate faith andmoratv
J
science. This attempt has been destructive to
religious faith, to good scientific methods, and to
moral
Science and technology, divorced from religious wis
"
values, constitute not only a myth, but the nightmare of the twen
tieth century.
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II Toward a Dialogue between- Faith

and

Science

I have indicated several reasons for dropping the self-deluding myth
of a purely historical approach to religious studies. But if we drop
this ideology, what shall replace it? This, I think, is the major
reason why so many scholars continue to have faith in the myth.
They feel that if they drop the idea of a purely neutral, value-free
approach, then history will be left in a quagmire of subjectivity. To
quote from Meier again, ‘Whether we call it a bias, a Tendenz, a
worldview, or a faith stance, everyone who writes on the historical
Jesus writes from some ideological vantage point; no critic is
exempt. The solution to this dilemma is neither to pretend to an
absolute objectivity that is not to be had nor to wallow in total rel
ativism.’28 Notice two things in this quotation: first, that a faith
stance creates a dilemma for the historian, and second, the fear of
relativism if we drop the myth of a purely historical Jesus. In fact,
Meier accepts here some version of the neutrality two-step: let us
admit our bias, follow a rigorous methodology, and try to be as
objective and religion-neutral as possible. But this assumes, all
along, that faith is a problem for scientific objectivity. There is, as
Ben Meyer puts it, a fear of subjectivity here. We are afraid as schol
ars that a post-modern perspective will lead to ‘anything goes’. Any
view of Jesus will be just as good as any other. We will, in fact, be
out of a job, no longer needed to guide young minds into the truth
about religious history. Ben Meyer points us to the proper way out
of this fear in his review of criteria or indices of authenticity: not to
shun subjectivity, but to embrace it as a moment on the way
toward objectivity.29
I have myself been involved in the study of the philosophy of sci
ence, so please forgive me if I put this whole issue in terms of the
relationship between faith and science. In this brief essay I can, of
course, only suggest a way forward. First of all, let us recognize the
prejudice of perspective. This means that I, as a scientist (social or
natural), recognize that my world-view is bound to influence what
I call data, and how I weigh the evidence in reaching toward the
28 Meier, Marginal Jew, i. 5 f.
29 Ben Meyer, ‘Objectivity and Subjectivity in Historical Criticism of the Gospels’,
in D. L. Dungan (ed.), The Interrelations of the Gospels, BETL 95 (Macon, Ga./Leuven:
Mercer University Press/Leuven University Press, 1990).
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best explanation. Second, we recognize pluralism in world-views.
Ihere are many different ways of understanding reality. Pluralism
and the prejudice of perspective should lead us to humility, but not
to despair or to relativism. Cognitive relativism does not follow from
plurality or from the prejudice of perspective.30 There is a real world
out there to know, and a real past, too. We do know things about
reality, after all. It does, however, lead to humility. Our results are
not certain. They are not purely neutral. They may be ‘scientific ,
but that does not grant them certainty as Troeltsch himself knew.
Let us embrace our faith, and recognize it for what it is. And of
course, by ‘faith’ I do not mean only religious faith, but would
include all world-views, such as Marxism or scientific materialism.
They, too, operate on faith or trust. We accept that faith may dis
tort our judgement, but at the same time, it may give us deeper
understanding. There just is no way to tell, except in the give and
take of pluralistic and public dialogue, whether our faith is distort
ing or helpful to understanding the object of study. So, in the end,
we subject our conclusions to public scrutiny and careful scientific
examination, then revise them in the light of what we learn in that

process.
So I am not abandoning the quest for truth and reality.
Relativism is just as destructive of true historical and scientific
research as the myth of a purely historical Jesus. I affirm objective
truth; it is the claim to objective knowledge I object to. Nor am I
suggesting a return to the old dogmatic method of presuming the
truth of our faith and refusing to change in the light of evidence.
But let us face the facts. The evidence about Jesus is slight, and
capable of many equally reasonable interpretations. The social sci
ences do not have the same objective status as the natural sciences,
for they cannot do experiments (except in a few cases) to test which
theory or interpretation is true. Measurements and mathematical
theories are few and far between in history. So the social sciences
draw more fully on subjective judgement. But this does not mean
that they are unscientific. And in the case of Jesus, the evidence is
so slight and so capable of many interpretations that our faith
» This is argued well by Gadamer in hermeneutics (Truth
Alasdair MacIntyre (First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary^ i & p
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1990)) for ethical principle , ‘ JN
f
Laudan for the philosophy of science (Science and Relativism (Chicag .
y
Chicago Press, 1990)).
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stance is bound to have a tremendous influence on our reconstruc
tion of the historical Jesus. But this does not mean that the quest is
in vain, or that faith is not at risk. It is. For Christianity has made
certain historical claims, and must demonstrate to a public, plural
istic audience that it has reasons, arguments, and evidence for
them. We can prove that Christianity is reasonable, even if we can
not prove it is true in the open market-place of ideas.31
I am arguing, then, that we must integrate faith and science,
reason and religion, in an overall coherent and rational world-view.
Each aspect of our world-view, both faith and science, has its place.
Each is open to modification in the light of the other. Faith and sci
ence must be in dialogue and mutual modification, as we seek an
overall world-view that is rationally satisfactory and existentially
meaningful.
There is one point at which the old myth of a purely historical
Jesus was correct. This has to do with the distinction between his
tory and the other sciences. While history does investigate the past,
its explanations are created in terms of psycho-social understand
ing. History is limited to the human, to human events and artefacts,
and to explanations in terms of psycho-social forces and institutions.
There is, in fact, a precise parallel here with natural science. Take
as an example the initial expansion of the universe at the Big Bang.
This is clearly a past event, but it is not a historical event (in the
sense of history as an academic discipline). Indeed, I think the term
‘historical event’ is a misleading one, since it can mean either a past
event or an event subject to historical explanation. More precision
can be had if we stick to natural-scientific explanations versus his
torical explanations. The Big Bang is subject to natural-scientific
explanations, but not to historical explanations. The American
Revolution, on the other hand, is an event that cannot be ade
quately explained by natural science. We need historical explana
tions, based on psycho-social causal factors, to understand it fully.
!1 This position represents what Stephen T. Davis calls ‘soft apologetics’. See his
debate on the resurrection with Gary Habermas and James Keller, in the pages of
Faith and Philosophy. Davis, ‘Is it Possible to Know that Jesus was Raised from the
Dead?’, I (1984), 147-59; Habermas, ‘Knowing that Jesus’ Resurrection Occurred:
A Response to Davis’, 2 (1985), 295-302; Davis, ‘Naturalism and Resurrection: A
Reply to Habermas’, 2 (1985), 303-8; Keller, ‘Contemporary Christian Doubts
about the Resurrection’, 5 (1988), 40-60; Davis, ‘Doubting the Resurrection: A
Reply to James A. Keller’, 7 (1990), 99-111. See also Davis, Risen Indeed (Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1993).

Advice for Religious Historians
Now the myth of a purely historical Jesus insisted on a is m
between theology and history. And this distinction is a va i
But it is best understood on the model of levels of explana ion 1
sciences.32 When teaching about Jesus in an academic an p. ‘
istic context, therefore, we should say this: our class is limi
events in the life of Jesus that are subject to historical explain
or verification. We focus on normal historical explanations
life of Jesus, and exclude from consideration any theologica
nations. In fact, this is what we do in any case, but let us
_
and up front about it. It is important to distinguish history r
ology, in terms of the goals and methods of each discip me.
can separate history and theology without the arroganc
myth of a purely historical Jesus. In terms of scholarly pumic
on the other hand, let us return to John Meier. His cone u
better than the methodology he espouses. His results: are
j^id
upon a mythological consensus among scholars.
a
say about his methodology is this: it is limited to even s
of Jesus that are subject to historical explanation, ocuse
j-rom
mal historical explanations for the life of Jesus, an exc
^at he
consideration any theological explanations. In fact, is i
does in any case.
.
,2 let us
With this difference between history and theo ogy m
> pened
take the resurrection of Jesus as an example. I t is eve
place
at all, it is a past event. Some have suggested that it 1 n
in space and time; yet, if it took place at all, it sure y
anti it
and time. If Jesus rose from the dead, this even ia c Terusalem.
took place at a certain location in space, jus ou
.jflc eXplaHowever, if it did happen, it is not subject o na un
Historical
nation. Likewise, it is not subject to historica exp ‘
’ t about
science is incapable of making a theological udgemcn^
whether or not God could or did raise Jesus (a
0„icai issue, of
torical scientific judgement is important to
b theologiCal
coursel. Rather, if the resurrection did take place, on y

in an Age of Science (San Francisco: I
Explanation in Theology and Science’, (
Gesellschaft, 7 (1994), 184-201, and idei
Christian Scholars’ Review (forthcoming).
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satisfactory to human reason. Social science cannot explain how
someone rose from the dead. So we can and should accept the differ
ence between natural-scientific, social-scientific (including historical),
and theological explanations. When John Meier writes about the res
urrection, he will no doubt limit himself to natural and historical
explanations of the event. And that is very helpful and important. But
we can separate history and theology without the myth of a purely
historical Jesus and all its arrogant and self-deluding properties.
Rather, we must insist that faith and science respect and learn from
each other, while recognizing that they are not the same thing (you
can learn exactly this same lesson by reflecting critically upon the
debate between evolution and ‘creation science’).
A good example of how the myth of a purely historical Jesus can
delude and confuse biblical scholars is the recent book on the res
urrection by Gerd Luedemann. There are a host of problems with
this book, but one of them is surely that Luedemann insists, against
both reason and faith, that historical explanation is the only legit
imate kind of explanation for past events. He rejects any ideci that
God might actually do anything in history that could be known by
people. Buying into the prejudice of modernity, he labels any
attempt to discuss theological explanation as ‘apologetic manoeu
vres to evade history. Here the historical question is demoted to a
question which is marginal compared with theology.’33 In fact,
Luedemann’s methodology reduces theology to mere social-scien
tific explanation. Reasons for past events based on the action of God
(what I am calling ‘theological explanation’) are ruled out a priori.
And that is just a piece of Enlightenment bias. The basic problem
here is a positivist or empiricist notion of what counts as ‘scientific
explanation’ (social or natural). Does this positivist bias lead, in his
book, to a better understanding of the early Church’s Easter faith?
Hardly. Because he refuses to allow the resurrection to (possibly) be
beyond historical explanation, he generates a so-called historical
explanation that is patently absurd, based upon pseudo-historical
‘depth psychology’ as a source for understanding the myth of the
resurrection, which Peter (in his grief) imagined to himself.
Luedemann’s treatment of New Treatment texts is a hatchet job,
based on a sceptical (rather than critical) approach to the texts. He
always finds some way to fit the texts to his anti-supernatural bias
” G. Luedemann, The Resurrection of Jesus, trans. J. Bowden (Minneapolis/
London: Fortress/SCM, 1994), 180.
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and psycho-historical prejudices. His so-called explanation is m fact
far less likely than any miracle! Here we find yet another book ship
wrecked on the shoals of the myth of a purely historical Jesus, just
to take one example, in discussing Paul’s first encounter wit
e
Risen One, Luedemann writes: ‘the conversion of Paul tuns [ is
emphasis!] in principle be accessible to historical criticism, even i
at present not all the details are yet known. Only through t e me 1
ation of an understandable [i.e. purely historical!] approac o e
event of Paul’s conversion is it possible to discuss its meaning ana
its significance.’34 In his polemic against Martin Hengel (w o cor
rectly insists, as a Christian scholar, that the resurrection is no
reducible without remainder to historical explanations) Lue ema"
demands that we attempt psycho-historical readings of t eaP0S
‘A really historical work cannot rest content’, he insists, wi a pc
event which cannot be fully explained by social science.
u
not? Is social science, rather than God, now omniscient, 1 1 P
udices and confusions like these, Luedemann’s boo provi e; c
excellent example of the way the myth of a purely istorica
leads to both bad history and bad theology.
,PhPa
This leads me to one last issue, which again can on y e °
upon briefly. I have been arguing that we shoult recognnJ/
publicly admit our trust or faith during scientific iny_esl c ,
Christian historians, then, should openly acknowledge their beliei i
the resurrection even while seeking careful historica an pu
dence for this claim. But this avoids ‘dogmatic circu arJonly if our faith is open to revision in the light o evi e
objection to the view I am arguing for might come from a misu
derstanding of ‘faith’.
;n the
A major error to Western thought has been committed m the
analysis of‘faith’. Because of the deep effect that faith has uponhfe,

some thinkers such as Soren Kierkegaard have msi
t,aSed
must have existential certainty." Therefore faith ««*>**£
upon the probability arguments of history, philosop y, <
,md
This error in analysis is at the root of the division e
We must not separate faith and science again in our
w Ibid. 59. He refers here to ‘Holsten’s starting point’ and clear y c
self.
» Sds8 Kierkegaard, Conclude Unscientific
tran.D. P. S— an
W. Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, I94i)» -
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this leads to terrible destruction. But what, then, is the right under
standing of the relationship between faith and reason? As a Christian
I have faith in Christ, a faith which I would, under God’s care, be will
ing to die for. Hopefully I will not be put to the test! But this strong
existential certainty does not translate into epistemic certainty. That
is the category mistake that Kierkegaard, Bultmann, Willi Marxsen,
and so many others have made. Rather, my interpretation of the
meaning of my faith in God must be open to rational reflection and
revision in the light of reason, evidence, and argument. Of course, this
rational reflection does not happen at the same moment, or in the
same mood, as the experience of faith itself. My rational reflection and
interpretation of faith constitute a different, critical moment, quite dis
tinct from the personal and existential moment of faith. Few people
hold their deepest faith because of arguments. And religious faith is
certainly quite different in its logic and ‘grammar’ from a scientific
hypothesis. Nevertheless, our faith itself, and especially our interpre
tation of the meaning of that faith, is open to revision in more criti
cal and reflective moments. In the face of objections to faith, or in the
face of terrible experiences of suffering or oppression, I may come to
doubt. At that point my continued faith may well depend upon argu
ments, reasons, and evidence, as well as the private and personal
grounds on which faith originally rose and continues to well up in my
soul. I may also encounter difficult questions, or rational problems,
with the implications of my faith. In such instances, I have a duty to
myself and the truth to investigate the reasonableness of my beliefs.
Fideism is in the long run unsatisfactory.
Let us take up the example of the resurrection of Jesus. Imagine
that after careful historical research I concluded not only that there
is limited evidence for a resurrection of a publicly available sort
(which is compatible with belief in the resurrection), but that all the
best evidence was against the resurrection. What then? Would that
change my faith? It would certainly change my interpretation of
Christianity. Gone would be any hope of my own real resurrection
after death, for example. My understanding of biblical authority
would no doubt weaken, if this central historical claim turned out
to be false. But I would hope that my faith in God, and in Jesus,
would still remain. I might become a liberal United Methodist the
ologian, but I would not cease to be a Christian.
Our interpretation of both faith and science must be open to revi
sion in the light of reason, evidence, and argument. Of course, there
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is no one right understanding of reasoning or logic, or of what
counts as evidence and a good argument. Here we have to do the
best we can, with the tools and methods that are most appropriate
to our quest for truth. But there can be no guarantees to truth, no
in the area of faith and not in the area of science.
Let us therefore embrace our faith, and recognize it for what it is,
but be willing to admit that others’ faiths have insight we neee
us use our best methodologies and scientific, critical thinking, u
this does not mean that we have to be sceptical of the religion we
are studying, or of its texts and sources. Let us, instead, se^ °
understand, sympathize with, and appreciate the religious Lu s
study. In terms of education, this means that the job of rea8ion,
Bible teachers is not to destroy the faiths of our students, e a
a moral duty not to use our position as teachers to undermine ant
shock the religious faiths of our students, however naive or c ose
minded they may be. Instead, let us help each student to
their own faith (not ours, theirs) with the methods, scho ars ip,
results with which vigorous academic training have Pr0^ e
suggest that it is bad pedagogy to seek to ‘blow away e u
mentalists’, however tempting it may bel Rather, co ege an
versity students need help in the integration of fait an sci
whatever faith they may have.
The myth of a purely historical Jesus has distorte sc
long enough. It has served as a mask to shield us rom cn 1
’
delude ourselves and others, to confuse us as to the c ara^
historical method and the certainty of our historica resu
post-modern situation, progress will be made on y w e
embrace and understand our own faith stance, s a e
the public and pluralistic market-place of ideas, a
®
reasons, evidence, and arguments we can for our cd
plea, then, is this: let us take off the mask of pure objectivity, an
speak to each other face to face.37
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